Animal Health Policy in South Asia: What can Economic Analysis Contribute? by Ahuja, Vinod
  INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT 
AHMEDABAD y  INDIA 










Animal Health Policy in South Asia: 
















The main objective of the working paper series of the IIMA is to help faculty members, 
research staff and doctoral students to speedily share their research findings with professional 
colleagues and test their research findings at the pre-publication stage. IIMA is committed to 
maintain academic freedom. The opinion(s), view(s) and conclusion(s) expressed in the 








INDIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT 
AHMEDABAD-380 015 
INDIA   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
 
  Page No. 2  W.P.  No.  2007-12-03 
Animal Health Policy in South Asia: 








Animal health policy in South Asia region has been characterized predominantly by direct action by 
the government either in providing services to livestock farmers or in undertaking livestock 
productivity enhancing measures. It is a widely held view among policy makers that given the 
poverty status of livestock farmers, the potential of livestock in contributing to poverty reduction, 
and poverty reduction being a public good, there is strong rationale for direct action by the 
government as opposed to regulatory, monitoring and market enhancing role. Accordingly, most 
governments in South Asia have developed large networks of publicly supported service providers 
backed by free or heavily subsidized input supply.  
 
A series of studies undertaken to assess the distributional outcomes of the above policy have 
however raised questions about the desirability of such a policy and the need to fine tune service 
delivery systems including creating space for other non-government service providers. These studies 
make a reasonably strong case for reducing the subsidies in the form of free services and putting 
this money into services such as disease prevention, reporting, control, awareness education and so 
on, for these are the services that are currently neglected due to fiscal pressures and are likely to 
generate a larger social good than simple treatment services.  
 
The question then is that if policy choices are so clear, why animal health policy in the region 
continues to encourage ‘pervasive direct action by the government’ in livestock service delivery 
instead of a more facilitating role. To address that question the paper shares the experience of one 
such attempt to understand and influence animal health policy in one of the southern states of India. 
Based on that experience, the paper argues that policies are an outcome of a process of complex 
interactions between economic logic, formal and informal power structures, legacies of trust and 
mistrust, and communication narratives. While significant investment is often made in clarifying the 
economic logic of alternative policy prescriptions and outcomes, very little thought and investment 
goes into managing and broad-basing policy processes. The process leading to ‘wider buy-in’ can 
often be far more important and needs equal, if not more, attention than economic analysis. This 
requires greater emphasis on socio-political studies of ‘policy processes’ and a long term strategy 
of investment in ‘relationship building’.  
                                                 
1 Vinod Ahuja is Associate Professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India.  
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Animal Health Policy in South Asia: 
What Can Economic Analysis Contribute? 
 
Animal health policy in South Asia region has been characterized predominantly by direct 
action by the government either in providing services to livestock farmers or in undertaking 
livestock productivity enhancing measures. It is a widely held view among policy makers 
that given the poverty status of South Asian livestock farmers, the potential of livestock in 
contributing to poverty reduction, and poverty reduction being a public good, there is strong 
rationale for direct action by the government as opposed to regulatory, monitoring and 
market enhancing role [Ahuja (ed), 2004]; Ahuja, Morrenhof and Sen. 2003. Ahuja, Umali-
Deininger and de Haan. 2003. Ahuja, McConnell, Umali-Deininger and de Haan.  2004. 
Accordingly, most government in South Asia have developed large networks of publicly 
supported service providers backed by free or heavily subsidized input supply.  
 
Any casual observer of livestock farmers in South Asia would perhaps sympathize and 
support the above policy stance. Given the role of public policy in creation and fair 
distribution of the economic pie, above policy would make eminent sense on the grounds of 
fairness and social justice. A more careful analysis of the distributional outcomes of the 
above policy however raises questions about the desirability of such a policy and the need to 
fine tune service delivery systems including creating space for other non-government 
service providers. A series of studies in four states of India, representing different 
economic, social, market and production contexts, analyzed distributional outcomes of this 
policy (Ahuja. This paper summarizes the results of those studies to demonstrate, from 
users’ perspective, the need for change in this policy. It then shares the experience of one 
attempt to understand and influence animal health policy in one of the southern states of 
India and concludes with some observations on the complexity of policy making processes 




The studies were conducted in four states of India representing a wide range of livestock 
production, marketing and socio cultural contexts as shown below.  
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1.  Gujarat—front runner in dairy cooperative movement, relatively commercialized 
production system, experience with different systems of service delivery including 
cost recovery by cooperative service providers. Located on the west coast. 
2.  Rajasthan—although located adjacent to Gujarat, the state represents arid production 
zone with annual rainfall approximately 800mm and vast geographical area under 
desert conditions.  
3.  Kerala—a small state in South India with long history of crossbreeding and highest 
proportion of crossbreds in livestock population. A state known for its achievements 
in male and female literacy and high outmigration. Highest density of veterinary 
institutions (dispensaries, hospitals and polyclinics) 
4.  Orissa—a mid size state on the eastern coast. Highest rural and urban poverty 
incidence among all states of India, highly subsistence production system, high tribal 
population, and poor social and physical infrastructure. 
 
Further comparative statistics across these states are given in Table 1. 
 
Household surveys of livestock farmers were conducted to understand the differential 
access by various categories of service users and the potential impacts of alternative policy 
choices. The first of the two surveys covered service provider units operated by various 
agencies—government, cooperative unions, private entrepreneurs and NGOs. The second 
survey covered livestock owning households and collected information on livestock assets 
and services, household characteristics, and agriculture activities of selected households. 
The basic questions that the surveys sought to address were 
 
1.  Who are the primary service providers? What kind of services are available from which 
providers? 
2.  What is the level of access to these services for the beneficiaries? 
3.  How is the use pattern for these services different for different groups of farmers? 
4.  At what price are these services available? Do the poor receive services at a different 
price? 
5.  How do various service providers fare with respect to price and non-price factors? How 
do the users perceive the price and quality of these services? 
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The findings based on the household surveys have already been published in Ahuja, Umali-
Deininger and de Haan (2003) and Ahuja, Morrenhof and Sen (2003). Here we summarize 
the key findings borrowing heavily from these two papers. 
 
Table 1: Comparative profile of the study states 
Indicator Gujarat Rajasthan Kerala  Orissa All 
India
  
Geographical area (‘000 Km
2) 196.0 342.2 38.9  155.7 3287.3




























Number of livestock (millions)  21.2 49.1 3.6  23.4 464.5
Proportion of crossbreds in total cattle (%)  8.66 4.28 81.01  7.65 12.34
Proportion of buffaloes among total 
livestock animals (percent) 
33.1 21.2 1.8 6.0 20.1






















Average rainfall (mm)  1004.2 817.8 2911.3  1337.6 47647


























                                                 
2 Veterinary polyclinics are the veterinary hospitals with multiple specialities and specialists such as surgery, gynaecology, 
radiology, etc. These employ several postgraduate veterinarians and are located mostly in state headquarters and at times in 
some important district headquarters. Veterinary hospitals are institutions with inpatient facilities and with usually one or 
two qualified veterinarians. These are located mostly in district headquarters. Veterinary dispensaries are the same as 
hospitals but without inpatient facilities and with only one qualified veterinarian. First aid centres are minor dispensaries in 
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Primary Providers and access to services  
 
In all the study states, the veterinarians employed by the State Animal Husbandry 
Departments (SAHDs) are the primary service providers. They provide services through the 
network of veterinary dispensaries, veterinary hospitals and polyclinics and First Aid 
Veterinary Centres. Except in the case of emergencies, all government services are 
supposed to be delivered at the centres. In the case of emergencies, the government 
veterinarians are allowed to make home visits and charge a nominal fee to cover the 
transportation cost. After office hours, however, the veterinary doctors were allowed to 
engage in private practice. But, in reality, private practice by government veterinarians was 
widespread even during office hours. 
 
Alternative sources of livestock services include cooperative unions, private veterinarians 
and some NGOs. Among the four states included in this study, cooperatives offer a 
significant alternative only in some districts of Gujarat. The cooperative service is mostly 
delivered at home. Extent of private veterinary practices on farm animals is extremely 
limited and they generally operate in areas where other service providers—government, 
cooperative, NGOs, etc—are not able to meet the demand.  
 
In Gujarat, Kerala and Orissa, there is fairly good access to these services with more than 95 
percent sample respondents in these states stating they would be able to obtain government 
veterinary services when needed. In Rajasthan, the comparable figure was 63 percent. The 
proportion of those having access to cooperative veterinary services was 47 percent in 
Gujarat and about 14–17 percent in Rajasthan and Kerala.
 
 
An important question in this context pertains to differential access to these services by poor 
and non-poor. More specifically, do the poor households have similar access to these 
services as the rich? Table 2 compares the proportion of those in the bottom, middle and top 
20 percent households, as ranked by a wealth index based on ownership of household 
assets, who responded ‘yes’ to the access question. It is clear that in Gujarat and Kerala, all 
households had good access, while in Rajasthan the poor felt more constrained with respect 
to receiving veterinary services. For example, in Rajasthan approximately 64 percent of the 
households in the bottom group reported having access to government veterinary services at 
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the centre against 94 percent in the top group. Comparable figures for home service were 58 
percent and 93 percent.  
 
Table 2: Access disaggregated by wealth categories 
(Percent) 
Do you have access to   Bottom 20%  Middle 20%  Top 20% 
 Gujarat 
Ethnic/traditional healer  71  58.0  52.4 
Private veterinarian  6  11.1  7.3 
Cooperative veterinarian   52  55.5  40.2 
Government veterinarian  












Ethnic/traditional  healer 75.6 86.1 91.5 
Private veterinarian  2.7  12.5  26.8 
Cooperative veterinarian   2.7  11.1  23.9 
Government veterinarian  












Ethnic/traditional  healer  8.2 4.8 2.4 
Private  veterinarian  22.4 19.0 26.5 
Cooperative veterinarian   12.9  17.9  19.3 
Government veterinarian  















Analysis of data on the number of veterinary visits made by different providers indicated 
that a larger number of these cases were attended at home. It was quite common for the 
government veterinarians to attend even ordinary sickness cases at farmers’ homes and the 
majority of such visits were undertaken in a private capacity. In fact, farmers in all income 
groups revealed a clear preference towards home service and the government veterinarians 
catered to that preference mainly in a private capacity. Analysis also indicated that, on a per 
adult bovine basis, the number of visits in Rajasthan and Kerala increased with income 
whereas this trend was less sharp in Gujarat. Further, in Gujarat, there was no significant 
difference in the proportion of home versus in-centre services across income groups. Both 
these trends were, at least partly, explained by the availability of relatively inexpensive 
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home service from the cooperative unions. In all the three states, the proportion of those 
opting for the services of private veterinarians increased with income. This was specially 
evident in Rajasthan and Kerala where private usage of the top 20 percent was more than 
double the rate of lowest 20 percent. At least part of this tendency could be explained by the 





Generally all three types of providers—government, private, and co-operative—were 
providing the full range of curative veterinary services, that is, general sickness, 
gynaecological problems, injuries and minor surgeries. Farmers were required to go to 
veterinary hospitals  and polyclinics only in the case of major surgery. Such cases were, 
however, few in number and farmers generally did not seek major surgeries.  
 
For in-centre service, the prescribed prices were either zero or very nominal (in the range of 
Rs.2 to Rs.5 per visit, including medicines, depending on the type of animal). In reality, 
however, the service users incurred expenditures that were significantly higher than 
officially prescribed price. As per the data collected in the survey, average visit price for in-
centre service was about Rs.40.00 in Rajasthan, Rs.18.00 in Kerala, and Rs. 5.00 in Orissa. 
Total cost, including the cost of drugs and medicines purchased from the market, turned out 
to be approximately Rs. 125.00 in Rajasthan, Rs.50.00 in Kerala, and Rs. 70.00 in Orissa
3.  
 
The story for home service is similar. Even though the government veterinarians were 
allowed to charge a nominal amount for home visit to cover transportation cost, in reality 
the charges   were significantly higher than what could be justified as the transportation 
cost. Estimated average cost of a home visit (including the cost of medicines purchased at 
the stores) by a government veterinarian was Rs.178.00 in Kerala, Rs.160.00 in Gujarat and 
Orissa, and over Rs.300.00 in Rajasthan (Table 3). As a share of total cases (in-centre and 
home), only about 15 percent were treated for free in Rajasthan, 25 percent in Kerala, and 
about 45 percent in Orissa. 
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3 USD-INR exchange rate at the time of Gujarat, Rajsthan and Kerala surveys was approx Rs.43/USD. At the 
time of Orissa survey the exchange rate had moved to Rs.48/USD.  
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With respect to prices, there are two more questions that need closer examination. One, 
were the majority of those receiving services at official prices poor?, and two, were the 
prices paid by the poor significantly lower, if not zero, than those paid by the rich? 
 
With respect to the first question, analysis indicated that of those receiving service for free, 
only about 10 percent in Rajasthan and about 30 percent in Kerala belonged to the bottom 
quintile. Coming to the second question—whether the average price paid increased with 
economic status—it appears that average expenditure per animal per veterinary visit was 
indeed lower in the case of poor households. At the same time, however, to be able to 
conclude that the poor received services at the discounted price, one will need to control for 
variation in the service quality. This question is further explored below.  
 
Table 3: Total charges per home visit 
(Rs.) 
Disease Gujarat  Rajasthan  Kerala 
  Govt Coop    Private Govt  Private Govt Private 
Orissa 
 
General sickness  153  49  173  275  214  175  140  .. 
Gynaecological problems  248  59  284  306  316  180  ..  233 
FMD ..  ..  ..  292  ..  134  ..  71 
Mastitis ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  235  ..  190 
Injury 117  ..  ..  ..  ..  150  ..  121 
Pneumonia ..  ..  ..  258  ..  ..  ..  .. 
HS ..  ..  ..  302  ..  ..  ..  204 
Other 146  50  157  314  ..  120  ..  .. 
Overall average  161  51.5  202.  333  286  178  204  .. 




That the users paid significantly more than what was officially prescribed is established 
beyond doubt from the data presented. An equally important question is however is how did 
the users perceive the prices and service quality? To get a sense of use perceptions, the 
survey asked the users if they considered the the quality to be ‘satisfactory’ and the cost to 
be ‘reasonable’.  
 
In general, there was widespread satisfaction with the service quality. In Gujarat over 80 
percent of the cases attended by cooperative veterinarians received a ‘satisfactory’ quality 
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as well as a ‘reasonable’ cost rating from the users. Comparable figures for private and 
government veterinarians were 76 and 68 percent. Kerala and Orissa did even better on the 
quality rating and there were no appreciable differences across private and government 
veterinarians. A large number of users in Gujarat, Kerala and Orissa considered the price of 
the services to be reasonable. In Rajasthan on the other hand, however, a significantly larger 
proportion of respondents considered the price to be unreasonably high. Given that average 
charges per visit in Rajasthan were substantially higher than in other states, this result 
makes intuitive sense.  
 
Finally, a comparison of perceptions across income groups reveals an interesting pattern. In 
both Gujarat and Rajasthan, the proportion of those who responded that quality is 
satisfactory and cost is reasonable increased with the income, but the association was much 
less pronounced in the case of quality than in the cost. 
 
Price and demand structure 
 
The descriptive analysis in the preceding sections provides a reasonably good idea of the 
structure of market in terms of overall availability, prices, and use perceptions. Still 
however the analysis is not sufficient to evaluate the potential distributional impact of any 
change in service delivery policy, specially with respect to subsidies. That question requires 
an understanding of the factors influencing the demand for these services, especially the 
magnitude of price elasticities (net of other factors influencing demand) and how these vary 
with income. We therefore now turn to analyzing (i) the price differences across 
government, private veterinarians and cooperative unions, and (ii) price elasticities of 
demand for veterinary services for different income groups. 
 
Price differences across provider types 
 
Regression results with price as dependent variable are presented in Table 4. Looking first 
at the coefficients on the variables GOV and COOP, it is clear that except in Gujarat, there 
was no significant difference in the fee charged by government and private veterinarians.  In 
Gujarat, although the users paid prices that were higher than prescribed, these were still 
lower than the prices charged by private providers. Controlling for service quality as well as 
location specific characteristics, the average difference between private and government 
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doctor appeared to be in the range of Rs.60.00–70.00. Service from cooperative unions in 
Gujarat was still cheaper
4.  
 
Table 4:  Explaining the variation in price per visit
5






















SUPMED (1 if supplied medicines during the visit, 
0 otherwise) 



























SICK1 (1 if gynaecological or surgical case, 0 
otherwise) 


















Diarrhoea -- --  --  -74.3 
(-5.0)
Mastitis -- --  --  86.8 
(2.1)
SOLVED (1 if the problem was solved in that 
















Asset Index      -19.3 
(-2.2)
POOR (1 if household belongs to bottom 40 















Adjusted  R-squared  0.27 0.18 0.44 0.60
N (sample size)  356 340  612  297
Note: Figures in parentheses are t- Statistics. * Significant at 1 percent level $ Significant at 
5 percent level;   @ Significant at 10 percent level 
Source: Ahuja, Umali-Deininger and de Haan (2003) and Ahuja, Morrenhof and Sen (2003) 
 
 
                                                 
4 The sample size for private veterinarians in both Kerala and Rajasthan was too small to allow meaningful testing of the 
differences. Thus, the finding of no significant difference in these two states is not very robust. 
 
 
5 The design of Orissa survey was slightly different than other three states and hence not all variables are similarly defined. 
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Interaction term between GOV and POOR help us answer the question-- did the poor 
receive government services at a relatively lower price? In all the three states, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is statistically insignificant. This implies that there is no 
targeting of relatively cheaper services towards the poor in any of the three states. It appears 
that the prevailing price in poorer areas was somewhat lower than that prevailing in richer 
areas. But, within the given area, both poor and rich paid the same price. 
 
Demand for Veterinary Services 
 
Regression results for demand for veterinary services are presented in Table 5. Primary 
variables of our concern in the Table are the price of veterinary care, the wealth index and 
the interaction between price and wealth. The coefficient on price is negative and 
statistically significant in all the three states. This is consistent with economic theory and 
implies that a higher price does depress overall demand. Neither of the other two 
variables—wealth index and the interaction between wealth and price—is statistically 
significant. This implies that income is not a major determinant of service utilization. The 
sign on this parameter is positive in Rajasthan and Kerala, which is consistent with a-priori 
expectations. In Gujarat, however, the analysis shows a negative wealth effect. One possible 
explanation for this result could be that the incidence of sickness in Gujarat may be lower 
for richer households compared to the poorer ones due to better diet and care, whereas such 
a relationship was not very strong in other two states. Estimates of price elasticity of 
demand are presented in Table 6. Although the slope of demand function does not vary with 
income, we still calculated the elasticities for different income groups by valuing them at 
the mean price and visits for the respective income groups. 
 
To recapitulate, the analysis presented above establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that (i) 
subsidized or free services are not reaching the farmers as intended, (ii) farmers are actually 
not looking for free or subsidized services as they consider the prices they are currently 
paying as ‘reasonable’, (iii) the prices charged by government and private veterinarians are 
not significantly different, and (iv) the structure of ‘economic demand’ for these services is 
not very different across poor and non-poor. This would make a reasonably strong case for 
reducing/withdrawing these subsidies and putting this money into services such as disease 
prevention, reporting, control, awareness education and so on, for these are the services that 
are currently neglected due to fiscal pressures and are likely to generate a larger social good 
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than simple treatment services. Disease prevention and control is also likely to result in 
reduced private cost of treatment by way of bringing down the incidence of those diseases 
that have serious livelihood implications for the poor. A number of models are now 
available around the world to organize effective and efficient service delivery in a wide 
variety of production, market and socio-economic contexts.  
 
Table 5: Demand functions for veterinary services  
Department Variable: Number of veterinary visits 
during the reference period of the survey 
Explanatory Variable 

















































Sickness  dummy (1 if no animal sick 






































Number of desi cows owned by the 
household 
- -  -  0.016 
(0.065)
Number of crossbred cows owned by the 
household 
- -  -  0.265 
(0.146)#
Number of bullocks owned by the 
household 
- -  -  0.096 
(0.049)*
Number of small ruminants owned by the 
household 
     0.063 
(0.012)$
Sample size  367  297  387  160 
Log likelihood  -289.71  -296.11  -567.80  -189.0 
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Table 6: Price elasticity of demand for veterinary services 







Obvious question then is that if policy choices are so clear, why animal health policy in the 
region continues to encourage ‘pervasive direct action by the government’ in livestock 
service delivery rather than the government focusing more on delivery of public good 
services and playing a regulatory and market enhancing role supported by targeted direct 
action. Obvious answer of course is that ‘good economics’ is only one of the many inputs in 
the choice of policy options. Indeed, policy has been described as a ‘chaos of purpose and 
accidents’ and not necessarily a matter of the rational implementation of the choices 
supported by economic analysis. It is therefore of critical importance to understand the 
processes that govern the choice of policy options and identify leverage points that can be 
used to influence choice of policy options in favor of intended beneficiaries, specially the 
poor. These processes depend heavily on socio-politico-economic context and therefore 
vary greatly within and between countries.  
 
In what follows, we briefly describe one attempt to understand and influence animal health 
policy in one of the southern states—Andhra Pradesh, in India
6. Even though this is not one 
of the four states presented above, the state does have close similarity to above states in 
many respects and therefore serves to illustrate the inherent complexity of policy making 
processes. 
 
Assessment and reflections on livestock services delivery in AP 
 
As in other states of India, in Andhra Pradesh as well the Government continues to be largest 
provider of livestock services to farmers. Services are provided largely from stationary 
veterinary centres. As usual, the government system of Livestock Service Delivery is 
                                                 
6  See Ahuja, Joseph, Gustafson and Otte. 2006; Ahuja, Kurup, Bhasin and Joseph. 2006. Sastry, and 
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generally slow to catch up with changes in production systems or the resultant service needs.  
The stakeholders generally have little influence on such changes, and economic sustainability 
of service delivery by governments is not on high focus as the service delivery system is 
sustained mostly through budgetary support. Similarly, public good services like prevention, 
control and eradication of diseases, disease surveillance, quality enforcement of drugs, 
vaccines and biologicals, etc do not receive their due priority. The systems under public-
private partnership, NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs), on the other hand, 
aim at economic viability, wider reach and door delivery of services over time.  
 
To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of livestock service delivery systems and to suggest 
appropriate reform measures, the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative of Food and 
Agriculture Organization in partnership with ‘Capitalization of Livestock Program 
Experiences India’ project of SDC/IC and Animal Husbandry department of Government of 
Andhra Pradesh, initiated a multi-tier consultative process to identify service needs of farmers 
and gaps in service delivery systems and to develop a widely owned reform action plan.  The 
initiative functioned under the overall guidance and supervision of a multi-stakeholder 
Steering Committee chaired by the top bureaucrat from Animal Husbandry Department. 
Through detailed consultations and studies, the initiative, identified the service needs of the 
small livestock holders and the gaps and deficiencies in service delivery. The new input led 
the stakeholders to demand further widening of the scope and coverage of the initiative. The 
resultant refinements included wider area and stakeholder coverage under the consultative 
process, additional studies to identify the gaps and weaknesses of the Para-veterinary system 
and putting in place a legal frame for delivery of minor veterinary services. It also led to the 
development of an efficient and practical prevention and control strategy and an action plan 
for six animal diseases of economic importance to the poor.  
 
The participatory process in which the state Department of AH and the major stakeholder 
categories played an active role, improved the acceptability and implementability of the 
proposed reforms. Evolving a common agenda amidst opposing views, striking a balance 
among strong divergent demands of stakeholder groups and maintaining strict neutrality of 
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The process followed in the AP could perhaps be described as ‘Inquiry Process’. This 
involved talking to a wide range of stakeholders to ascertain their (often differing) views on 
effective livestock service delivery systems, discussing it with technical experts and 
peoples’ representatives, and conducting field studies to take an informed view on a policy 
intervention.  
 
The process began with organization of consultative workshops at the village and district 
levels involving farmers, people’s organizations, government departments, financial 
institutions, and local civil society and community based organizations. The workshops at 
the district level were preceded by team consultations in selected villages representing a 
range of livestock delivery systems and poverty contexts. First two workshops were held in 
Mahboobnagar—the district with high density of small ruminants, and Chittoor—a drought 
prone district with high proportion of crossbreds. Both these workshops were organized by 
SMILDA (State Management Institute for Livestock Development) and district level 
Animal Husbandry Departments with support from Hyderabad. The CEO of Andhra 
Pradesh Livestock Development Agency (APLDA) and Additional Director (Animal 
Husbandry Department) facilitated the deliberations in these workshops. 
 
Subsequent to these two workshops and village consultations, some allegations were made 
that the consultative process was narrow and an attempt to lend legitimacy to a pre-
conceived agenda of privatization. Doubts were also expressed on the sincerity and ability 
of government officials to lead a complex consultative process with objectivity. The project 
team responded to this criticism by further widening the consultative process and inviting 
some NGOs to lead the consultative process. Organization of the next farmer workshop was 
therefore shared by a local NGO and the government.  
 
The picture of conflicting interactions between politics, history, culture and ideologies that 
emerged from this process turned out to be far more complex than what was anticipated by 
the project team.  Evolving a common agenda against opposing views, striking a balance 
among strong divergent demands of stakeholder groups and maintaining strict neutrality of 
the consultative process turned out to be major challenges the project had to deal with. 
Indeed, the lessons that came out were highly sensitive and the process often painful as 
most of them had to do with relationships between people. Several times during the 
consultative process, emotional temperatures were raised high specially if there was a 
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perceived threat to someone’s interest. That posed the danger that this will lead to shutting 
down the communication rather than stimulating it. 
 
Despite a complex political and social history of elites dominating the power structure, 
however, the project team could stay on course without compromising the core values of 
openness, transparency and inclusive participation. One of the reasons for the same appears 
to be the prior stock of ‘social capital’ created by few collaborating partners. Due to the 
history of prior partnerships between Animal Husbandry Department and other 
collaborators, AHD already had significant exposure to participatory processes and the 
AHD staff did not feel threatened by openly discussing their strengths and weaknesses. Due 
to the same reasons, it was also possible to identify selected individuals within and outside 
the government who would commit themselves to the core values of participation and 
change.  
 
As stakeholder consultations progressed, and the gaps and deficiencies in service delivery 
were identified, the new information enabled the stakeholders to demand a further widening 
of the scope and coverage of the initiative. The resultant refinements included wider area and 
stakeholder coverage under the consultative process, additional studies to identify the gaps 
and weaknesses of the Para-veterinary system and putting in place a legal frame for delivery 
of minor veterinary services. It also led to the development of an efficient and practical 
prevention and control strategy and an action plan for six animal diseases of economic 
importance to the poor. The participatory process in which the state Department of AH and 
the major stakeholder categories played an active role, improved the acceptability and 
implementability of the proposed reforms.  
 
The key lesson that emerged was that policies are an outcome of a process of complex 
interactions between economic logic, formal and informal power structures, legacies of trust 
and mistrust, and communication narratives. While significant investment is often made in 
clarifying the economic logic of alternative policy prescriptions and outcomes, very little 
thought and investment goes into managing and broad-basing policy processes. As 
illustrated above the process leading to ‘wider buy-in’ can often be far more important and 
needs equal, if not more, attention than economic analysis. This requires greater emphasis 
on socio-political studies of ‘policy processes’ and a long term strategy of investment in 
‘relationship building’.  
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